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WHAT JURORS WANT TO KNOW: MOTIVATING 
JUROR COGNITION TO INCREASE LEGAL 
KNOWLEDGE & IMPROVE DECISIONMAKING 
SARA GORDON

 
What do jurors want to know? Jury research tells us that jurors 
want to understand the information they hear in a trial so they can 
reach the correct decision. But like all people, jurors who are asked to 
analyze information in a trial—even jurors who consciously want to 
reach a fair and accurate verdict—are unconsciously influenced by 
their internal goals and motivations. Some of these motives are 
specific to individual jurors; for instance, a potential juror with a 
financial interest in a case would be excluded from the jury pool. But 
other motivations, like the motive to understand the law and to reach 
an accurate verdict, are core social motives that influence the 
cognition of all jurors. Although those motives may be less obvious 
than those of the juror with a financial stake in the case, they still 
have a profound influence on how jurors learn the law and interpret 
evidence, and we can use them to better motivate jurors to efficiently 
learn the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to 
the facts they will see in a trial. 
A significant body of legal literature has examined jurors’ use and 
understanding of the substantive law they receive in jury 
instructions, and many scholars have recommended methods to 
improve juror comprehension of instructions. This Article is the first 
law journal article to take that analysis a step further and consider 
all of the major scientific studies that examine motivated cognition 
and apply them to jury decisionmaking. Because much of juror 
cognition is motivated, we can harness the power of this motivated 
cognition to further increase juror comprehension of the law and 
improve juror decisionmaking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It’s not that I’m so smart, it’s just that I stay with problems 
longer.” 
           -Albert Einstein 
 
In a study at the University of Minnesota, female college 
students participated in what they were told was a “dating study.”1 
All of the women received certain information about the dating 
preferences of an attractive man named Tom Ferguson.2 They were 
told that Tom had examined the personality files of 50 other women, 
and based on those women’s personal characteristics, had decided 
which of them he wanted to date.3 The women were then asked to 
decide, based on Tom’s decisions, which characteristics were most 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Allan R. Harkness et al., Personal Involvement and Strategies for Making 
Contingency Judgments: A Stake in the Dating Game Makes a Difference, 49 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 24 (1985). 
 2. Id. at 27. 
 3. The complete list of possible attributes included having a sense of humor, 
being outgoing, being jealous, being athletic, being liberal, having high intelligence, 
and being attractive. Id. 
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important to Tom in a partner.4 Some of the women believed they 
would have a date with Tom after they completed the study, and 
some did not.5 The women who were motivated to be accurate—those 
to whom the information was important because they expected to 
date Tom—paid closer attention to the information in the 
personality files, thought more carefully about their decisions, and 
used more complex and more efficient assessment strategies when 
deciding what Tom was looking for in a partner.6 In other words, 
because they wanted to know more about Tom, they worked harder 
to make good decisions.7 
Like the women in the dating study, jurors who are asked to 
analyze information in a trial—even jurors who consciously want to 
reach a fair and accurate verdict—are unconsciously influenced by 
their own internal goals and motivations.8 Some of these motives are 
specific to individual jurors; for instance, a potential juror with a 
financial interest in a case would be excluded from the jury pool. But 
other motivations, like the motive to understand the law and to 
reach an accurate verdict, are core social motives that influence the 
cognition of all jurors.9 Although those motives may be less obvious 
than those of the juror with a financial stake in the case, they still 
have a profound influence on how jurors learn the law and interpret 
evidence. 
While jurors have traditionally been seen as “blank slates” who 
could be instructed to base decisions solely on the permissible 
evidence and the appropriate legal standard, the social science 
research on both jurors10 and other human decisionmakers11 does 
not support this view. Instead, as with all people, motivated 
cognition affects the way jurors acquire knowledge and make 
decisions about information. Because motivations are pervasive and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 27, 31. 
 6. Id. at 31. 
 7. Id. Both groups of subjects used statistically comparable amounts of time in 
assessing the information, but those in the “dating” group employed more complex 
strategies during that time. Id. 
 8. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated 
Cognition, And Some Problems For Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 
(2010). 
 9. See generally ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 
246 (1999) (discussing how personal goals and motivations influence judgments). 
 10. See, e.g., Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror 
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991). 
 11. See, e.g., Paul T. P. Wong & Bernard Weiner, When People Ask “Why” 
Questions, and the Heuristics of Attributional Search, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 650, 661–62 (1981). 
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largely unconscious, we cannot eliminate their influence on jury 
decisionmaking. Moreover, it would be impossible to even catalogue 
the huge variety of ideological beliefs and worldviews that influence 
and motivate jury verdicts, nor can we expect to fully mitigate jurors’ 
preconceptions on their understanding of the law and evaluation of 
evidence. All of these things motivate jurors’ decisions, and like most 
biased reasoning, they cannot be severed from jurors’ interpretation 
and processing of evidence.12 What we can do, however, is harness 
the power of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to learn the law 
and use it to make better decisions about the evidence. Specifically, I 
propose that we use insights from studies of motivation and goal-
setting to motivate jurors to understand the law, to be accurate in 
that understanding, and to persist in thinking about the law until 
they reach a good decision. 
Part I of this Article discusses the use of jury instructions as the 
primary vehicle for juror education about the law, as well as the 
persistent lack of juror comprehension of those instructions, even 
when the instructions are rewritten according to psycholinguistic 
principles. This Part also discusses the importance of the 
representative jury in the American legal system and why that 
system is not undermined by more extensive juror education about 
relevant legal concepts. This Article does not suggest that we should 
abandon our representative system, but instead recommends that 
courts use principles of motivation and goal setting to help lay juries 
develop greater knowledge of the applicable law. Because motivations 
have such a profound impact on knowledge acquisition and 
information processing, Part II of this Article will examine the 
different types of core social motivations that are most relevant to 
juror comprehension and decisionmaking, specifically the motives to 
understand and be accurate, and the motive for closure. Part III 
reviews the social science literature on knowledge and performance 
goals and deliberative and implemental mindsets to explain how 
jurors can be motivated to understand the law needed to interpret 
facts in a trial and to persist in thinking about the law until they 
reach a decision. Part IV recommends methods to motivate jurors to 
learn and understand the law before reaching a verdict. Educational 
psychology principles inform this discussion and help illuminate how 
to improve juror comprehension of substantive and procedural laws, 
thereby improving decisionmaking. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See, e.g., Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case 
Study, 49 J. ABNORM. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129 (1954) (finding that subjects’ mental 
states shaped how they interpreted evidence). 
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I.  LOW JUROR COMPREHENSION OF THE LAW AND WHY MORE 
EXTENSIVE JUROR EDUCATION IS NOT AT ODDS WITH A 
REPRESENTATIVE JURY SYSTEM 
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental part of the American 
democratic ethos, and much of the trust we place in jurors is based 
on our belief that they will infuse the decisionmaking process with a 
common sense approach and community values.13 In addition to 
basing their decisions on common sense, however, we expect that 
jurors’ decisions will be legally warranted and internally 
consistent.14 We implicitly assume that by the end of a trial, jurors 
understand the law they will be expected to apply to the evidence, or 
at least that their understanding will be good enough to reach the 
“right” verdict.15 The social science research on jury comprehension 
of jury instructions tells us otherwise, however, with comprehension 
rates sometimes no better than chance.16 Furthermore, the research 
consistently shows that if jurors do not understand the law—and as 
laypeople, they typically have little or incorrect knowledge of the law 
when they enter the courtroom—they will rely on preexisting 
stereotypes, biases, and incorrect expectations of what the law is.17 
In other words, jurors often know just enough about the law to be 
dangerous but not enough to reach a decision on the facts that is 
well-supported by the relevant law.18 
Because juries are typically composed of lay people with no 
special legal training or background, jurors must first be educated 
about the applicable substantive law and procedural rules before 
they can reach a decision. This education is typically accomplished 
by giving the jury written instructions, which are culled from the 
applicable statutes and case law and drafted by attorneys or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 31 (1986); see also 
DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 184 
(2012) (stating that common sense is “[a] primary justification cited for entrusting 
jurors with the task of deciding criminal verdicts”). 
 14. See SIMON, supra note 13, at 184–85. 
 15. See id. at 185. 
 16. See generally id. (citing various studies). 
 17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Instructing on Death: Psychologists, Juries, 
and Judges, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 423, 429–30 (1993); see also Sara Gordon, 
Through The Eyes Of Jurors: The Use of Schemas in the Application of “Plain-
Language” Jury Instructions, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2013) (discussing the impact of 
schemas on juror comprehension and use of jury instructions). 
 18. See generally Gordon, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of schemas on 
juror comprehension and use of jury instructions). 
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advisory committees.19 Instructions tell jurors about the applicable 
law and give them a mechanism to interpret the facts they have seen 
in a trial; they are meant to provide the entirety of substantive legal 
knowledge jurors need to make a decision in a case.20 Jurors are 
given instructions throughout the trial, but the most extensive 
instructions on substantive law are generally given at the end of a 
trial.21 Instructions, therefore, are the crucial link between how 
jurors perceive and understand the facts they are told and how they 
use those facts and the law to reach a verdict; jurors, however, do not 
typically receive this legal education until after they have seen the 
evidence.22 When jurors do finally receive instructions, the 
instructions are often full of language taken from statutes and cases. 
While the instructions are meant to teach jurors the relevant law, 
they are not typically drafted with the jurors’ education in mind, nor 
do they generally offer much guidance to jurors for applying that law 
to the facts in order to reach a decision. 
Because the rules of evidence limit inquiry into the jury’s 
decisionmaking process, it can be difficult to determine the extent to 
which jurors understand the law they receive in jury instructions.23 
However, research in social science has consistently shown that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 19. See generally Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving 
the Language of Jury Instructions, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081, 1083, 1085 (2001) 
(discussing the history and evolution of jury instructions). 
 20. Different types of instructions address the different things the jury is asked 
to consider. Some instructions tell jurors how to evaluate evidence and weigh the 
credibility of witnesses, some explain the burden of proof, and others provide 
definitions and elements of crimes or claims. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, 
AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 161 (2007). 
 21. There are very few laws regulating the use and timing of jury instructions, 
and the judge’s authority to manage a trial effectively allows for instructions at any 
point. Neil Cohen, The Timing of Jury Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 684 (1999–
2000). 
 22. See generally HON. GREGORY E. MIZE (RET.) ET AL., THE STATE-OF-THE-
STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 36 (2007) 
[hereinafter State of the States Survey], available at http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/ 
~/media/Microsites/Files/CJS/SOS/SOSCompendiumFinal.ashx. While some states 
do require some type of pre-instruction, most leave the decision to the judge’s 
discretion, though the survey results suggested that “many judges who pre-
instructed their juries view this technique as part of a set of jury trial practices; 
those who did so were also significantly more likely to permit jurors to take notes, to 
submit questions to witnesses, to permit juror discussions before deliberations, to 
deliver final instructions before closing arguments, and to provide jurors with a 
written copy of the instructions.” Id. at 37. 
 23. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
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jurors have considerable difficulty understanding instructions,24 and 
several studies have found that jurors typically understand a little 
more than half of the instructions they receive.25 Much of this 
research has focused on improving juror comprehension by rewriting 
the instructions using psycholinguistic principles to improve 
vocabulary, syntax, and organization, making them simpler and 
more comprehensible to jurors.26 Pattern and standard instructions, 
particularly those rewritten according to psycholinguistic principles, 
have improved juror comprehension, often by 20 to 30%.27 Because 
jury instructions can form a basis for legal arguments on appeal, 
however, many of these pattern instructions have emphasized 
technical accuracy, sometimes overlooking the primary purpose of 
the instructions: to teach jurors the law28 And as one author notes, 
“no matter how technically accurate an instruction is, it fails in its 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. See, e.g., Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and 
Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 788 (2000); Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in 
Light of It?, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. 
Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976). In one 
empirical study of juror confusion, researchers found that jurors understood less 
than half the content of the tested instructions. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 
77, 78 (1988). In another, despite instructions to the contrary, 43% of potential jurors 
believed that circumstantial evidence was of no value, and 23% believed that when 
faced with equal evidence of a defendant’s guilt or innocence, the defendant should 
be convicted. Id. at 84–85. 
 25. See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language 
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
1306, 1316 (1979) (54%); Phoebe Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1989) (“[O]nly half of the references to the law 
were accurate, even when credit was given for partial accuracy. One-fifth of the 
references were clearly, seriously wrong.”); Amiram Elwork et al., Toward 
Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1981–82) (51%). 
 26. The study of psycholinguistics provides insights about the linguistic reasons 
underlying problems of language processing and comprehension. See Charrow & 
Charrow, supra note 25, at 1308; see also Robert D. Charrow, Joel D. Lieberman & 
Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589, 623–27 (1997); Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 165–
69. 
 27. See Joel D. Lieberman, The Psychology of the Jury Instruction Process, in 
JURY PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL ASPECTS OF TRIAL PROCESSES 142 (2009). 
 28. Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors Understand Criminal 
Jury Instructions? Analyzing The Results Of The Michigan Juror Comprehension 
Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 404 (1990). 
758 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:751 
 
primary purpose if jurors are unable to use it to deliberate and 
determine verdicts.”29 
Furthermore, these reforms do not address the fact that even if 
jurors understand the language and syntax used in instructions, this 
does not mean that they necessarily understand the underlying 
substantive law, and such an understanding is crucial to a juror’s 
ability to analyze the facts in a trial. Jury research shows that jurors 
have difficulty understanding instructions about both procedural 
and substantive legal concepts, and the problem extends to civil and 
criminal trials.30 For example, one study found that even where 
reasonable doubt is defined in jury instructions, 69% of people who 
had previously served as jurors incorrectly believed that they had to 
be 100% sure of the defendant’s guilt before they found him guilty.31 
Substantive instructions pose a similar problem.32 In the same 
study, two-thirds of instructed jurors incorrectly thought that 
physical injury was necessary to convict for assault.33 Jurors also 
have difficulty understanding a variety of concepts related to civil 
litigation including negligence, liability, and damages.34 Finally, and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 29. Id. at 404. 
 30. See generally id. (discussing the impact jury instructions have on jurors’ 
understanding, and the confusion that may result from the instructions). 
 31. Id. at 414. Reasonable doubt was defined as follows: 
A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the evidence or 
lack of evidence in this case or growing out of any reasonable or legitimate 
inferences drawn from the evidence or the lack of evidence. It is not merely 
an imaginary doubt or a flimsy, fanciful doubt or a doubt based upon the 
mere possibility of the innocence of the defendant or a doubt based upon 
sympathy, but rather it is a fair, honest doubt based upon reason and 
common sense. It is a state of mind which would cause you to hesitate in 
making an important decision in your own personal life. By stating that the 
prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, I mean there must 
be such evidence that causes you to have a firm conviction to a moral 
certainty of the truth of the charge here made against the defendant. 
Id. at 436. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 423 (finding that jury instructions for assault did not 
improve comprehension). 
 33. Id. at 423. 
 34. See, e.g., Edith Greene & Michael Johns, Jurors’ Use of Instructions on 
Negligence, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 840, 840 (2001) (finding 64% overall 
comprehension of civil negligence instructions); Reid Hastie et al., A Study of Juror 
and Jury Judgments in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 L. & 
HUM. BEHAV. 287, 295 (1998) (finding that the average score on a comprehension 
test of jury instructions on liability was 9%). 
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most distressingly, capital instructions in death penalty trials are 
especially hard for jurors to understand.35 When study participants 
were read standard California death penalty instructions and asked 
to define the concepts of aggravation and mitigation, 21% of 
participants either incorrectly defined or did not define aggravation, 
and 47% incorrectly defined or did not define mitigation.36 
Given the significant role jurors play as decisionmakers in our 
legal system, this lack of comprehension is troubling. 
Notwithstanding the persistently low comprehension rates, however, 
some scholars make the point that jurors do in fact understand most 
of the evidence and applicable law they see in trials, and that judges 
agree with jury verdicts in most cases.37 One study found a 78% 
agreement rate between judges and juries, which the author noted is 
almost as good as the 79% or 80% agreement rate among judges 
making sentencing decisions on custody cases38 But while this 
observation is, of course, important when comparing the 
decisionmaking of judges and juries, as Professor Dan Simon notes, 
“it hardly speaks to the actual diagnosticity of either one.”39 
Moreover, law is a domain in which knowledge about the domain 
confers competence, and jurors would benefit from additional 
training before being asked to reach a decision.40 In other domains, 
competence is not wholly dependent on underlying knowledge.41 For 
instance, a person could competently dunk a basketball without 
knowing the rules or the history of basketball, but the same is not 
true of the law. Jurors without legal knowledge or with incorrect 
legal knowledge could certainly make a decision, but that decision is 
not likely to be “correct” in that it is supported by the relevant law.42 
Furthermore, recent research on metacognition and self-assessment 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 136 (citing various studies). 
 36. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A 
Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 
411, 419, 421 (1994). 
 37. See, e.g., RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF 
EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 17 (2010) (citing various 
studies). 
 38. Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1919, 1961 (2009). 
 39. SIMON, supra note 13, at 203. 
 40. See generally Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of 
It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-
Assessments, 1 PSYCHOL. 30, 44 (2009) (noting that in many domains of life, success 
depends on knowledge). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 17, at 429–30 (discussing various irrelevant 
factors that may influence a juror’s decision). 
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has found that people who are unskilled in “intellectual domains” 
like the law suffer from dual burdens: first they reach incorrect 
conclusions and make poor choices, and second, they are unaware of 
their own lack of skill in the domain.43 
Moreover, most of the empirical research shows that while jurors 
perform competently in many cases, when problems do arise, it is 
usually a problem with the form or manner in which information is 
presented to jurors.44 Because jurors must understand what the law 
is before they can process it thoughtfully and apply it to the facts 
they see in a trial, we can improve juror performance by improving 
the ways we present the law to jurors.45 Common sense tells us that 
jurors would make better decisions if given better training about the 
law, and studies from educational and social psychology confirm that 
this knowledge acquisition should be a major component of the jury’s 
task.46 As Professor Joel Lieberman notes, rewriting instructions is 
only part of the solution.47 To make additional improvements, we 
should also consider recent advancements in social, cognitive, and 
educational psychology, especially those approaches that allow 
jurors to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial.48 
Finally, more extensive juror education is not at odds with the 
idea of a representative jury because the dual goals of a 
representative jury—that of a “jury of peers” composed of a 
“reasonable cross-section” of the community49—are both concepts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Kruger & Dunning, supra note 40, at 44. 
 44. JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 7 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds., 1997); see, 
e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil 
Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727 (1991). 
 45. Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment 
with Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 409 (1989) 
(finding that pre-instructions help jurors follow legal guidelines in decisionmaking 
and increase juror satisfaction); JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS, supra note 44, at 7; see 
Haney & Lynch, supra note 36, at 427; see also Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163 
(finding that pre-instructions gave jurors a greater opportunity to focus their 
attention on relevant evidence and remember it). 
 46. See generally Honorable B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and 
“Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 
1244 (1993) (“[T]he emphasis in the classroom is plainly upon learning. So it is, or, as 
we have seen, should be, in the courtroom for jurors . . . . The aim of the teacher is to 
impart knowledge and understanding; likewise with trial lawyers and judges.”); see 
also discussion infra Part III.B. 
 47. Lieberman, supra note 27, at 149. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition 
of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, 
necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the 
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defined by how we compose juries, and not how we prepare those 
sitting juries to best evaluate the evidence they see in a trial.50 The 
jury of peers is intended to give defendants a fair trial by including 
in the jury a representative number of people who share his 
“cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or, possibly, socioeconomic 
circumstances.”51 In contrast, the reasonable cross-section 
requirement ensures that members of the jury are drawn from all 
segments of the community in which the trial occurs.52 
Of course, the representative jury is based on the premise that 
the ordinary citizen is capable of sorting out the details of most 
lawsuits. Furthermore, some research suggests that representative 
juries composed of people with different backgrounds and 
experiences promote accurate fact-finding because such a group is 
likely to hold diverse perspectives on the evidence, engage in more 
thorough debate, and more closely evaluate the facts.53 As Vidmar 
and Hans note, “The idea of a representative jury is a compelling 
one. A jury of people with a wide range of backgrounds, life 
experiences, and world knowledge will promote accurate fact-
finding . . . .”54 But we do not neutralize the benefits of this range of 
perspectives by informing those perspectives with the proper legal 
                                                                                                                 
 
community.”). 
 50. The representative jury is a fundamental part of the American legal system 
stemming from the Magna Carta, which required that “charges against barons 
should be heard by other barons, their ‘peers,’ rather than the king.” VIDMAR & 
HANS, supra note 20, at 66. And while women and minorities were historically 
excluded from jury service, and service was limited to landowners until the second 
half of the twentieth century, our legal system eventually moved to one of a jury of 
peers drawn from a cross-section of the community. See id. at 66, 74; JAMES OLDHAM, 
TRIAL BY JURY: THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT AND ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL JURIES 
176 (2006). 
 51. OLDHAM, supra note 50, at 176. 
 52. This second requirement argues against juries with special skills or special 
qualifications, although there are examples of such “special juries” composed of citizens 
with relevant specialized knowledge that will help them to more efficiently make 
decisions about cases. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 68. The earliest known 
special jury convened in 1351, when a jury composed of cooks and fishmongers decided 
the case of a defendant charged with selling bad food. Another special jury was the 
“jury of matrons,” all-woman juries assembled in cases in which a convicted woman 
awaiting execution “pleaded her belly,” or claimed to be pregnant. The jury of 
matrons decided the truth of the claim and determined whether the execution should 
be stayed until the child was born. Id. For an excellent discussion of the historical 
development and current status of the special jury, see OLDHAM, supra note 50, at 
176. 
 53. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 74. 
 54. Id. 
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rules and standards. And while it may be true that too much 
expertise might actually hinder decisionmaking,55 this Article does 
not argue that we should increase jurors’ expertise to that of the 
lawyers or judges in the case, a solution that is neither practical nor 
consistent with the ideals of a representative jury. Instead, we 
should give jurors a basic legal education of the concepts they will be 
expected to apply to the facts beyond that which they receive from 
typical jury instructions. 
Unlike judges and lawyers, who will have well-developed 
knowledge about the legal concepts in a trial, jurors will often have 
little legal knowledge and limited exposure to legal concepts, most of 
which is gained through television and movies.56 The judges and 
lawyers are legal “experts” who have an understanding of the law 
that is complex, organized, and accessible, resulting in more 
thoughtful judgment and better decisionmaking.57 In contrast, lay 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. KISER, supra note 37, at 22 (noting that when lawyers achieve a certain 
level of expertise, they actually become worse at evaluating cases because they 
become so rooted in their own ideas about what the law is and should be). Indeed, 
Kiser notes that attorneys, like other highly successful people, “deflect criticism, 
rarely change their opinions, [and] resist feedback . . . [they] lack self-awareness and 
resist behavioral changes required to improve their problem-solving skills.” Id. at 
285. 
 56. Often referred to as the “CSI Effect,” much has been made in the law and 
media of the enormous impact fictional accounts of the legal system have on the 
average citizen’s understanding of the law and the courtroom. See, e.g., Conny L. 
McNeely, Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System: Television Imagery and Public 
Knowledge in the United States, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. & POP. CULT. 1 (1995); Victoria S. 
Salzmann & Philip T. Dunwoody, Prime-Time Lies: Do Portrayals of Lawyers 
Influence How People Think About the Legal Profession?, 58 SMU L. REV. 411 (2005) 
(noting that “movies change perceptions of the legal process, and that process then 
conforms to our expectations”); Jeffrey Toobin, The CSI Effect: The Truth About 
Forensic Science, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/reporti 
ng/2007/05/07/070507fa_fact_toobin (discussing the unrealistic expectations that 
people may develop as a result of exposure to television). 
 57. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 173–74 (1984). 
Experts have better developed and more mature “schemas” for legal concepts, which 
are more complex and more organized than the immature schemas of novices. Id. In 
one study examining how schemas differ between novices and experts, researchers 
compared the approaches of first-year law students (novices) and civil lawyers 
(experts) to two tasks, a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. See Fleurie 
Nievelstein et al., Expertise-Related Differences in Conceptual and Ontological 
Knowledge in the Legal Domain, 20 EUR. J. COGN. PSYCHOL. 1043, 1047 (2008). The 
card-sorting task asked participants to sort cards into groups based on different legal 
concepts and was intended to provide insight into “differences in the organisation of 
conceptual knowledge of individuals at different levels of expertise.” Id. The concept-
elaboration task asked participants to name everything they knew about a particular 
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jurors are “novices” who lack mental frameworks for the law and 
often have incomplete and sometimes incorrect legal knowledge.58 
Knowledge becomes more structured and more accessible with 
increasing expertise.59 Those with greater knowledge and expertise 
are therefore better able to moderate inconsistencies and to make 
more focused judgments and decisions.60 As Fiske and Taylor note, 
“[a]ll other things being equal, greater complexity moderates 
judgment. The more variety one has encountered, the more complex 
the issues, the less clear-cut it all seems, and the less extreme one’s 
judgment.”61 
Although the egalitarian ideal of a jury composed of a cross-
section of the community at first seems to argue against juries with 
special training or skills, there are examples of these kinds of 
“special juries” composed of ordinary citizens with relevant 
specialized knowledge.62 The earliest known special jury was formed 
in 1351, when a jury of cooks and fishmongers decided the case of a 
defendant charged with selling bad food.63 Another well-known form 
of the special jury was the “jury of matrons,” all-woman juries 
assembled in cases in which a convicted woman awaiting execution 
“pleaded her belly,” or claimed to be pregnant.64 The jury of matrons 
decided the truth of the claim and whether the execution should be 
stayed until the child was born.65 Furthermore, using experts to 
                                                                                                                 
 
topic in a short period of time (two to three minutes) and was intended to provide 
insight into the participants’ depth of knowledge about the legal concepts and any 
associations they made with other concepts. Id. The experts interpreted the two 
tasks more efficiently and effectively than the novices who lacked mental 
frameworks for the law. Id. For example, in the card-sorting task, the experts used 
more central concepts when clustering concepts, while novices ordered their concepts 
more randomly. Id. at 1055. In the concept-elaboration task, experts used more legal 
definitions in their explanations of a particular concept, including examples from 
cases, while novices used more everyday examples. Id. at 1056. 
 58. Nievelstein et al., supra note 57, at 1046. 
 59. Id. at 1058. 
 60. Id. 
 61. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 173–74. 
 62. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 20, at 68. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. (noting that, while the use of special juries was fairly common in 
England in the 1700s, their use declined and was abolished in 1949). While half of 
American states have at some point had some form of special jury statute, today only 
Delaware has a specific statute allowing for special juries in complex cases. Id. at 69. 
Some question the constitutionality of employing special juries in complex civil 
ligation. See, e.g., Morris S. Arnold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by 
Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Patrick Devlin, Jury 
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resolve disputes outside of the jury system has an extensive history 
in the United States, including the use of legal experts as 
arbitrators, administrative judges, and specialty court judges.66 
Abandoning the representative jury system entirely in favor of a 
system of special juries of experts is an extreme solution and one 
that is unlikely to find broad support in the courts. Furthermore, 
there are benefits to a representative jury that would be lost in such 
a system. A compromise position, therefore, is a representative 
system that attempts to better educate lay jurors to increase their 
knowledge of the relevant legal concepts, but without abandoning 
the many benefits those lay jurors bring to the evaluation of 
evidence. Because so much cognition is motivated, we can come 
closer to achieving this ideal by motivating jurors to learn and 
understand the law and to think carefully about how the law will 
apply to the facts they will see in a trial. By focusing on jurors’ 
knowledge acquisition and development, we can develop jurors’ legal 
knowledge and, in turn, make their decisionmaking processes more 
efficient, flexible, and legally accurate. 
Although extensive training in the law is not possible given the 
time constraints of a typical trial, we can draw upon insights from 
studies of motivation and goal setting to motivate jurors to 
efficiently learn the law that will apply to the facts in a trial. We can 
do this by framing the jurors’ task with knowledge goals, and by 
teaching jurors the law before they hear about the facts to help them 
maintain a deliberative mindset. These things can help increase 
jurors’ motives to understand and be accurate, to minimize closure 
goals, and to refrain from “freezing” their information processing too 
early. Once we understand how to harness the power of motivated 
                                                                                                                 
 
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 43, 80 (1980); Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1005, 1007 (1992). 
Even in Delaware, it has become exceedingly rare to call a special jury, as many 
special jury requests are rejected due to insufficient complexity. OLDHAM, supra note 
50, at 199. One Delaware court noted that special juries are “contrary to 
fundamental concepts of jury trial and would substitute a method of selection which 
is inconsistent with established principles of justice.” Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc., 
1989 WL 70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989). Of course, the “complexity exception” 
also has its proponents. Judge Richard Posner has stated that he would favor a 
complexity exception in certain “complex commercial cases.” Jeffrey Cole, Economics 
of Law: An Interview with Judge Posner, 22 LITIG. 23, 66 (1995). He noted: “[I]t’s 
unfair really to put people through the task of trying to understand a subject which 
people of higher education and intellectual attainment spend a lifetime studying 
with imperfect understanding.” Id. at 67. 
 66. OLDHAM, supra note 50, at 196 (“The notion of bringing experts into dispute 
settlement processes makes good common sense and has an extensive history.”). 
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cognition, we can use insights from the fields of educational 
psychology and learning theory to increase efficient learning and 
allow jurors to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial. 
Specifically, to improve the jurors’ understanding of the law, we can 
implement a variety of teaching formats to increase learning, permit 
jurors to ask questions about the facts and the law, and encourage 
jurors to assess their own learning and to explain the law to 
themselves through the use of special verdict forms. 
II.  MOTIVATED COGNITION AND THE CORE SOCIAL MOTIVES THAT 
INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING 
In the classic study of “motivated cognition,” study 
participants—students from Dartmouth College and Princeton 
University—watched film clips from a recent football game between 
the two schools.67 The game was rough: a Princeton player broke his 
nose, a Dartmouth player broke a leg, and the referees made several 
controversial calls throughout the game.68 When study participants 
watched clips of the game, researchers found that the best predictor 
of their agreement or disagreement with the referees’ calls was 
whether the call favored or disfavored the students’ own school.69 
For example, Princeton students saw the Dartmouth players make 
twice as many infractions as they saw Princeton players make and 
over twice as many infractions as the Dartmouth students saw 
Dartmouth players make.70 
Researchers concluded that what the subjects saw was not just 
one football game, but “many different games and that each version 
of the events that transpired was just as ‘real’ to a particular person 
as other versions were to other people.”71 In other words, the mental 
state of the subjects didn’t just shape how they interpreted what they 
saw on the tape, it actually shaped what they saw.72 Professor Dan 
Kahan describes this type of motivated reasoning as “the 
unconscious tendency of individuals to process information in a 
manner that suits some end or goal extrinsic to the formation of 
accurate beliefs.”73 In other words, the perceiver’s goal motivates her 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Hastorf & Cantril, supra note 12, at 129. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 130. 
 71. Id. at 132. 
 72. Id.; see also Kahan, supra note 8, at 19. 
 73. Kahan, supra note 8, at 19. The seminal piece on motivated reasoning is 
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 480–81 
(1990) (noting that motivation affects “reasoning through reliance on a biased set of 
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cognition; it directs her mental operations and affects her 
assessment of empirical evidence.74 
Like the college students who saw the game the way they wanted 
it to be, all people sometimes engage in biased reasoning to bring 
their beliefs in line with their desires. For example, both opponents 
and proponents of capital punishment think that studies that 
confirm their beliefs are more effective than studies that disconfirm 
their beliefs.75 In that case, people are exhibiting “confirmation 
bias,” or the tendency of people to favor information that confirms 
their beliefs or hypotheses.76 Some biased reasoning is driven by 
stereotypes people have about social categories, though many biases 
have nothing to do with gender, race, or ethnicity.77 Furthermore, 
while some bias is explicit (in that people are aware of their own 
biases), much of the bias that impacts decisionmaking is implicit (in 
                                                                                                                 
 
cognitive processes: strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs.”). 
 74. Kahan, supra note 8, at 19. In a more recent study, researchers recruited 
two groups of potential parents, all of whom planned to have children. Anthony 
Bastardi et al., Wishful Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of 
Scientific Evidence, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 731, 731 (2011). While all of the parents said 
they thought kids did best when they were cared for at home, some of the parents 
planned to stay home with their kids and others planned to use daycare. Id. The 
parents were then given descriptions of studies comparing home and daycare. Id. 
The parents who planned to use daycare found the pro-daycare study much more 
persuasive than the pro-homecare study and the parents who planned to stay home 
with their kids found the pro-homecare study to be more persuasive. Id. at 731–32. 
For each set of parents, one study supported what they wanted to be true and 
therefore had a greater impact on their decisionmaking. Id. As the authors of the 
study noted, “what people believe to be true and what they wish were true can be 
quite different.” Id. at 732. 
 75. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: 
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2100–01 (1979). Each argument included a 
description of the design of the study and was followed by criticisms of the study 
itself and rebuttals of those criticisms. Id. Furthermore, the “net effect of exposing 
proponents and opponents of capital punishment to identical evidence—studies 
ostensibly offering equivalent levels of support and disconfirmation—was to increase 
further the gap between their views.” Id. at 2105. 
 76. JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR 
LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND 
DECISION MAKING 15 (2012). 
 77. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 
1128–29 (2012). For example, people tend to judge the likelihood of an event based 
on how readily they can remember examples of similar instances (the “availability 
bias”) and they tend to make judgments based on their first reaction gut feelings (the 
“affect heuristic”). ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 76, at 72–75. 
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that biases are “not consciously accessible through introspection”).78 
And while scholars have suggested ways to reduce bias,79 we cannot 
eliminate its influence on juror decisionmaking.80 But in the same 
way that human cognition is influenced by preexisting beliefs or 
cognitive biases, we can also motivate juror cognition by presenting 
jurors with information in a way that motivates them to understand 
the law and to persist in thinking about the law and facts until they 
reach a good decision. 
Social science research has repeatedly demonstrated that 
people’s motivations and goals have a significant influence on how 
they perceive, attend to, and interpret information.81 People with 
different motives or goals may arrive at very different decisions and 
may draw different conclusions from the same information as those 
motives or goals change.82 More specifically, motives influence how 
we notice and interpret information, as well as which knowledge 
structures or schemas we use to unconsciously filter the 
information.83 A review of the psychology literature identifies dozens 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. Kang et al., supra note 77, at 1129. 
 79. Id. at 1169; see ROBBENNOLT & STERNLIGHT, supra note 76, at 77–83; Craig 
A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the 
Perseverance of Social Theories, 1 SOC. COGNITION 126, 126 (1982). 
 80. See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin 
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. 
REV. 307, 346–47 (2010). 
 81. See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE, SOCIAL BEINGS: CORE MOTIVES IN SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 14 (2004) (noting that scholars define “motivation” differently); Kunda, 
supra note 73, at 480 (describing motivation as “any wish, desire, or preference that 
concerns the outcome of a given reasoning task”); Steven L. Neuberg, The Goal of 
Forming Accurate Impressions During Social Interactions: Attenuating the Impact of 
Negative Expectancies, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 375 (1989) (citing 
various studies); see also, e.g., GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL COGNITION 96 (2005) 
(defining “motive” as a “process of being driven to reduce some perceived discrepancy 
between the current state of the organism and some desired state of the organism”). 
 82. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 246. Contemporary motivation theory assumes 
that people initiate and continue behavior when they believe that those behaviors 
will result in their desired goals. Henk Aarts et al., On the Psychology of Drinking: 
Being Thirsty and Perpetually Ready, 92 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 631, 631 (2001); Edward 
L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The “What” and “Why” of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs 
and the Self-Determination of Behavior, 11 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 227, 227 (2000). 
 83. Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist 
Perspective On The Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 90 (2004); Kahan, supra note 8, 
at 19. Much of the research on motivated cognition is grounded in dual-process 
models of social psychology, which recognize that people make decisions and 
interpret information along a continuum from quick intuitive judgments to more 
thoughtful reasoning. See Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic and Systematic 
Processing, 10 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 44 (1999) (citing various studies); see also 
768 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:751 
 
of different motives, each of which have some influence on cognition 
and decisionmaking, and some of which overlap or conflict.84 And 
while jurors are influenced by many overlapping motives, including 
motivations personal to individual jurors like political ideology and 
racial bias, when they are acting in their capacity as decisionmakers 
in a trial, we can broadly categorize jurors’ core social motivational 
influences as the motives to understand and be accurate and the 
motive for closure. 
A.  The Motive to Understand & The Motive to Be Accurate 
Like other people, jurors have a strong desire to understand 
their world; they want to know the reasons things happen and why 
the law requires what it does.85 In a famous study testing this idea, 
researchers had an assistant approach people who were about to use 
a copy machine and ask if they could use the machine first.86 When 
                                                                                                                 
 
MOSKOWITZ, supra note 81, at 194 (describing the dual-process model coined by 
Marilynn Brewer). There are a variety of dual-process models, including Marilynn 
Brewer’s dual-process model, the heuristic-schematic model coined by Shelley 
Chaiken, and the theory of lay epistemics developed by Arie Kruglanski. Id. The 
various models use different terminology, but all of them describe people as using a 
combination of default information processing including schemas and heuristics, as 
well as more effortful and deliberate mental processing. For a review of the various 
models. See id. at 195–219. More recently, the dual-process model is often referred to 
as a “System 1/System 2” model, with System 1 involving “fast thinking” and System 
2 including “slow thinking.” See Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV., 1449, 1451 (2003) 
(crediting Keith Stanovich and Richard West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: 
Implications for the Rationality Debate?, 23 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 645 (2000) with 
coining the original System 1/System 2 label). Motivation influences both the form of 
decisionmaking that takes place (heuristic or systematic, System 1 or 2) and it 
directs whichever cognition ultimately occurs. Chen et al., supra, at 443. 
 84. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 83, at 91 (identifying the motive to 
understand, the motive to self-affirm, the motive to simplify, and the motive to 
cohere); FISKE, supra note 81, at 15 (identifying five categories of motives, including 
motives to belong, understand, control, self-enhance and trust); David A. Dunning, 
On the Motives Underlying Social Cognition, in EMOTION AND MOTIVATION 137, 138 
(Marilynn B. Brewer & Miles Hewstone eds., 2004) (identifying “desires” for 
“knowledge,” “affirmation,” and “coherence”). 
 85. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 141; see FISKE, supra note 81, at 88 (noting that 
although the type of unambiguous understanding that people seek varies among 
cultures, the basic need to understand is a core social motive that exists across 
cultures). 
 86. Ellen Langer et al., The Mindlessness of Ostensibly Thoughtful Action: The 
Role of “Placebic” Information in Interpersonal Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 635, 637 (1978). 
2014] WHAT JURORS WANT TO KNOW 769 
 
the assistant gave no reason for wanting to go first (“Excuse me, I 
have 5 pages. May I use the Xerox machine?”), 60% of subjects 
allowed the assistant to use the machine.87 Conversely, when the 
assistant gave a reason (“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use the 
Xerox machine, because I'm in a rush?”), 94% of subjects 
acquiesced.88 Interestingly, even when the assistant gave a 
meaningless reason (“Excuse me, I have 5 pages. May I use the 
Xerox machine, because I have to make copies?”), 93% of subjects 
still allowed the assistant to cut in line.89 In other words, as long as 
subjects were given some reason—legitimate or not—that helped 
them understand why the assistant needed to use the copy machine 
first, subjects were considerably more likely to allow the intrusion.90 
Closely related to jurors’ motives to understand the law and the 
facts in a trial are jurors’ motives to cohere and simplify the trial 
“story” they hear. When faced with conflicting explanations, jurors 
will tend to choose the explanation that “hangs together best, that is, 
the story that provides the most coherent explanation of all the 
relevant evidence.”91 Stories that explain more facts are more 
coherent, and jurors will therefore view those stories as more 
persuasive.92 Similarly, when asked to explain behavior, jurors, like 
other people, will prefer those explanations that are simplest or 
require the fewest assumptions.93 For example, when subjects were 
told that “Cheryl” was tired, had gained weight, and had an upset 
stomach, they preferred the explanation that she was pregnant to 
the explanation that she had mononucleosis, had stopped exercising, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Id. at Table 1. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 140; see also Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10, 
at 519 (explaining how jurors create a story that “hangs together”). 
 92. “[A]ll other things being equal, an explanatory hypothesis that explains 
more facts is more coherent and therefore viewed as a better explanation than an 
explanation that explains fewer facts.” Stephen J. Read & Amy Marcus-Newhall, 
Explanatory Coherence in Social Explanations: A Parallel Distributed Processing 
Account, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 429, 432 (1993). 
 93. Id. at 437. Dan Simon’s scholarship on cognitive coherence suggests that 
when jurors are asked to apply complex legal issues, they will seek to impose 
coherence on the complex task in front of them. Dan Simon, A Third View of the 
Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 
517 (2004). “Coherence-based reasoning posits that the mind shuns cognitively 
complex and difficult decision tasks by reconstructing them into easy ones, yielding 
strong, confident conclusions.” Id. at 513. In other words, instead of attempting to 
decipher confusing and complex legal issues, jurors will instead distill the complex 
decision into a simpler decision about which they can feel more confident. Id. at 517. 
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and had a stomach virus.94 The simple explanation of pregnancy was 
a better explanation than the conjunction of multiple examples.95 
Moreover, the broad explanation of pregnancy better explained all 
three facts—fatigue, weight gain, upset stomach—better than any of 
the narrow explanations—mononucleosis, no exercise, stomach 
virus—thus making that explanation more coherent.96 
Similarly, this desire to understand is closely related to jurors’ 
motivation to be correct in that understanding, or their motivation to 
be accurate. When people are motivated to be accurate, studies show 
that they pay closer attention, think more carefully, and are less 
likely to rely on general heuristics in reaching a decision.97 In 
another study, some subjects were told that after making a 
judgment, they would have to explain their thinking to 
researchers.98 Other participants were told that their judgments 
would instead remain confidential, and the experimenter would not 
know how they had responded.99 The participants were then given 
the responses of three actual people to sixteen personality questions 
and were asked to write a description of each respondent’s 
personality based on those responses and to predict how each 
respondent would respond to sixteen other personality questions.100 
The participants who were motivated to be accurate by being 
accountable formed more complex impressions of the three 
respondents, relied on a greater number of attributes to describe 
each person, and made more accurate predictions about how the 
respondents would answer the second set of questions.101 
Many studies suggest that if we increase jurors’ accuracy goals, 
this will improve their judgment, lead them to engage in more 
careful and elaborate thinking, and reduce bias.102 People are 
motivated to be accurate when they expect to be evaluated, when 
they expect to justify their judgment to other people, when they 
expect their judgment to be made public, or when they believe their 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Read & Marcus-Newhall, supra note 92, at 436–37. 
 95. Id. at 436. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Kunda, supra note 73, at 481 (suggesting that when people are 
motivated to be accurate, they pay closer attention and think more carefully); see 
also Harkness et al., supra note 1, at 22 (citing studies that suggest people rely less 
on heuristics when involved in solving a problem). 
 98. Philip E. Tetlock & Jae Il Kim, Accountability & Judgment Processes in a 
Personality Prediction Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 703 (1987). 
 99. Id. at 703. 
 100. Id. at 702–03. 
 101. Id. at 705. 
 102. See KUNDA, supra note 9, at 236. 
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judgment will have a real impact on other’s lives.103 Furthermore, 
people motivated in this way are less likely to exhibit a variety of 
cognitive biases: they are less likely to be unduly influenced by early 
impressions (the primacy effect),104 they are less likely to be 
influenced by the race of a writer when evaluating their work 
product,105 and they are less likely to anchor on irrelevant numbers 
when predicting the probability of an event.106 The reduction in bias 
of people with strong accuracy goals is probably due to their more 
careful and more elaborate thinking, as evidenced by the fact that all 
of these biases are exaggerated when people are under time 
pressure.107 
Jurors are motivated to understand the law and the facts in a 
trial and to fit these together into a cohesive trial story. This 
motivation is closely related to jurors’ motive to be accurate in that 
understanding. If we can harness these motivations by holding 
jurors accountable for their decisions, jurors will pay closer attention 
to the information they hear in a trial and think more carefully 
before reaching a decision. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See KUNDA, supra note 9, at 237–38 (citing various studies). 
 104. Arie W. Kruglanski & Tallie Freund, The Freezing & Unfreezing of Lay-
Inferences: Effects on Impressional Primacy, Ethnic Stereotyping, & Numerical 
Anchoring, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 448, 453–54 (1983). 
 105. Id. at 457. 
 106. Id. at 460–61. 
 107. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 238 (citing various studies). Accuracy goals alone 
do not guarantee increased accuracy, however. For example, telling someone to be 
accurate does generally not reduce bias, nor does paying someone to be accurate. See 
Mark Snyder & William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social 
Interaction, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1202, 1209–10 (1978) (explaining 
that subjects who were offered $25 to be “as accurate as possible” were not more 
likely to be accurate). Moreover, studies of people working in their field of 
expertise—a situation where subjects could be expected to be as accurate as 
possible—still show persistent inaccuracies in judgment. Steven L. Neuberg & Susan 
T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression Formation: Outcome Dependency, 
Accuracy-Driven Attention, & Individuating Processes, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 431, 433 (1987) (citing various studies). Moreover, accountability can make 
people defensive and self-serving when they have already committed to a choice. See 
generally Philip E. Tetlock et al., Social & Cognitive Strategies for Coping With 
Accountability: Conformity, Complexity & Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 632, 633 (1989). 
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B.  The Motive for Closure 
Like other decisionmakers, jurors need closure after making a 
decision; that is, they need firm answers to their questions.108 
Sometimes the motive to achieve closure—to arrive at a clear 
conclusion—becomes a goal in and of itself.109 Of course, like other 
motivations, this motivation for closure can vary from a strong need 
to achieve closure at one end of the spectrum to a strong need to 
avoid closure on the opposite end.110 If jurors have a strong need for 
closure, they may display cognitive impatience: they may rush to 
judgment and fail to consider alternative explanations.111 
Conversely, if jurors have a strong need to avoid closure, they “may 
savor uncertainty,” suspend judgment, and consider competing 
explanations.112 
One way to conceptualize the timeline of jurors’ knowledge 
acquisition is to break it into two phases: first, they generate 
hypotheses about the reasons for events, and second, they test and 
evaluate these hypotheses.113 Because there are a potentially infinite 
number of hypotheses for any given event, the process of generating 
hypotheses must stop at some point so that jurors can move to the 
second step.114 When they are motivated to achieve closure, jurors 
may “freeze” this hypothesis generation as soon as they have arrived 
at what is a “good enough” solution.115 Conversely, accuracy goals 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster, Motivated Closing of the Mind: 
“Seizing” & “Freezing,” 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 263, 264 (1996); see also Arie W. 
Kruglanski, Motivations For Judging & Knowing: Implications For Causal 
Attribution, in THE HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION: FOUNDATION OF 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 337 (E. Tory Higgins & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., Vol. 2 1990) 
(defining the need for closure as a desire for “an answer on a given topic, any 
answer, . . .  compared to confusion and ambiguity”). 
 109. Kruglanski & Webster, supra note 108, at 264. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. This is the lay epistemics model of dual-processing, which focuses on the 
factors that determine when closure occurs, or when people have sufficient 
confidence in a particular hypothesis to stop generating other hypotheses. See id. at 
334–35. 
 114. Id. at 335. 
 115. Id., at 336; see also KUNDA, supra note 9, at 242 (noting that people are 
motivated to obtain closure when they are operating under time pressure, when the 
decisionmaking task is tedious, or when they will be able to turn to a more enjoyable 
activity when the decisionmaking is complete); see also Kruglanski & Freund, supra 
note 104, at 461–62 (discussing how time pressure and evaluation apprehension 
affects “freezing”). 
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can motivate jurors to avoid closure: if jurors know that they will be 
accountable for the accuracy of their decisions, this can motivate 
them to prolong the decisionmaking process and think more 
carefully.116 
We can use closure goals to influence the amount of time and 
effort jurors spend on decisionmaking and can therefore affect the 
quality of those decisions.117 In a study demonstrating this effect, 
subjects watched a woman give a speech critical of student exchange 
programs and then answered a series of questions.118 Some subjects 
were told that the woman chose to read the speech, and others were 
told that she had no choice.119 Some subjects were motivated to 
obtain closure by being told that when they were done, they would 
be asked to watch a series of comedy clips, and others were 
motivated to avoid closure by being told that when they were done, 
they would be asked to view a lecture on statistics.120 Subjects 
motivated to achieve closure spent less time on the task than control 
subjects, and subjects motivated to avoid closure spent more time 
than controls.121 Furthermore, although subjects motivated to 
achieve closure reported a higher level of confidence in their 
decisions and believed the task required less thought than those 
motivated to avoid closure, they actually made poorer decisions and 
were more likely to incorrectly believe that the speaker’s expressed 
views were her actual opinion.122 In contrast, the more careful 
scrutiny triggered by the need to avoid closure helped to improve 
decisionmaking.123 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. KUNDA, supra note 9, at 243 (“Therefore, the consequences of closure 
avoidance can be expected to be the same as the consequences of accuracy goals—
greater accuracy and fewer biases when increased efforts yield reliance on better 
reasoning strategies, but not otherwise.”). 
 117. Id. at 245. 
 118. Donna M. Webster, Motivated Augmentation and Reduction of the 
Overattribution Bias, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 261, 262 (1993). Subjects 
were told they were participating in a subject designed to investigate how people 
form impressions of others based on limited information. Id. at 263. 
 119. In such circumstances, as a result of “correspondence bias,” people tend to 
assume that the speaker’s real opinions are consistent with her expressed views, 
even when they know the speaker had not chosen to express the views; they 
“exaggerate the extent to which her attitude corresponds to her behavior.” KUNDA, 
supra note 9, at 243 (discussing Webster, supra note 118, at 262). 
 120. Webster, supra note 118, at 262. Control participants expected to next 
complete a task that was similar to the first one. Id. 
 121. Id. at 264. 
 122. Id. at 264, 269. 
 123. Id. at 264. 
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A juror’s willingness to avoid closure and continue generating 
hypotheses about a certain event can be influenced by both cognitive 
capability and motivation.124 First, jurors may not be able to 
generate multiple hypotheses about what happened in the case at 
hand if they do not know what facts will satisfy the legal standard or 
claim; in other words, they will not know what they need to know.125 
We can help jurors develop the cognitive capacity to continue 
generating hypotheses about the trial “story” by teaching them about 
the law before the introduction of evidence.126 Second, jurors must be 
motivated to engage in hypothesis generation. We can motivate 
jurors to continue generating potential hypotheses by allowing them 
to ask questions about both the facts and the law in the case.127 
III.  HOW MINDSET AND LEARNING GOALS INFLUENCE JUROR 
DECISIONMAKING 
Although we can identify some core social motives—like the 
motive to understand and the motive for closure—that influence jury 
decisionmaking, we cannot know or control for all of the motivations 
that might influence individual jurors, especially when those jurors 
may not be aware of their own motives. What we can attempt to 
influence, however, is how carefully jurors think about and 
understand the law they are expected to apply to the facts in a trial. 
We can motivate jurors to understand the law and to be accurate in 
that understanding, and to avoid closure before they have carefully 
considered the law and the relevant facts. Specifically, we can 
motivate jurors to think more carefully about the law by inducing a 
deliberative mindset rather than an implemental mindset, and we 
can motivate jurors to learn the law by framing their task with 
knowledge goals rather than performance goals. 
A.  Deliberative & Implemental Mindsets 
Jurors who have not yet reached a conclusion about the facts in a 
trial will think differently about the law than jurors who have 
already reached a decision.128 This is because people develop a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Kruglanski, supra note 108, at 335. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction on Jurors’ Information 
Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220, 226 (1991) (finding 
that pre-instructed jurors were more likely to delay making a decision until after the 
close of evidence); see discussion infra Part III. 
 127. See discussion infra Part III. 
 128. See generally Peter M. Gollwitzer & Ronald F. Kinney, Effects of 
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“deliberative mindset” when they are actively deciding between two 
different actions or between action and inaction.129 The deliberative 
mindset concept refers to the notion that, because undecided people 
do not know where their decisions will ultimately take them, they 
remain more open to information and more evenhanded and 
accurate in their appraisal of that information.130 Research has 
shown that people in a deliberative mindset are more impartial 
when processing available information,131 and are less vulnerable to 
self-serving biases, including the illusion of control132 and overly 
positive self-perceptions.133 
In contrast, if jurors have already seen the facts in a case and 
have developed a “story” when they learn the law, they will be in an 
“implemental mindset,” where they try to fit the law to the story 
they have created.134 Unlike the deliberative mindset, which is 
characterized by an evenhanded consideration of different 
possibilities, the implemental mindset is characterized by 
considerations of how a given decision should be implemented to the 
exclusion of new information.135 If jurors are in an implemental 
mindset when they learn the law, they will only be focused on 
information relevant to the story they have already created136 and 
will tend to ignore information that does not support that story.137 If 
                                                                                                                 
 
Deliberative and Implemental Mind-Sets on Illusion of Control, 56 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 540 (1989) (discussing how a “deliberative mind-set” may shape 
an individual’s judgment); Peter M. Gollwitzer, Why We Thought That Action Mind-
Sets Affect Illusions of Control, 14 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 261, 264 (2003) (discussing how 
open-mindedness may influence the direction an individual’s final decision). 
 129. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540–41. 
 130. Heinz Heckhausen & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Thought Contents and Cognitive 
Functioning in Motivational versus Volitional States of Mind, 11 MOTIVATION & 
EMOTION 101, 118 (1987). 
 131. Jürgen Beckmann & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Deliberative Versus Implemental 
States of Mind: The Issue of Impartiality in Predecisional and Postdecisional 
Information Processing, 5 SOC. COGNITION 259, 276 (1987). 
 132. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540. 
 133. Shelley E. Taylor & Peter M. Gollwitzer, Effects of Mindset on Positive 
Illusions, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 213, 224 (1995). 
 134. Gollwitzer & Kinney, supra note 128, at 540–41. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Beckmann & Gollwitzer, supra note 131, at 276. 
 137. “It is not surprising, then, that people who are in the process of 
implementing an intended project do not reflect on its value in an evenhanded 
manner. Such deliberation would undermine their illusions and, thus, hinder 
efficient goal achievement.” Taylor & Gollwitzer, supra note 133, at 224; see 
Gollwitzer, supra note 128, at 264 (noting that “planning the implementation of a 
chosen goal should create a cognitive orientation (the implemental mind-set) that 
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jurors have a legal context in which to consider evidence, this will 
help them better understand the evidence when they hear it and 
apply it to the facts in the case.138 
Moreover, juror deliberation may be improved when jurors are in 
a deliberative mindset when they first discuss the evidence in a 
case.139 When jury deliberation begins with a vote, which puts jurors 
in an implemental mindset, jury discussions tend to be more 
argumentative because jurors advocate for their established 
positions. Professor Simon argues that when this happens, the jury’s 
evaluation of the evidence is “more disjointed, the connections 
between the law and the facts are less developed, and the debate is 
less rigorous and congenial.”140 For example, one study of real juries 
found that jurors who took a first vote within the first ten minutes of 
deliberation were more likely to hang than juries who deliberated 
before the first vote.141 
Furthermore, “cognitive load” is reduced when jurors are in a 
deliberative mindset, allowing them to devote more cognitive 
resources to learning the law.142 Cognitive load theory is concerned 
                                                                                                                 
 
facilitates the task of the preaction phase (i.e., getting started on the chosen goal). As 
this requires a more focused and selective orientation to processing information, 
closed-mindedness rather than open-mindedness with respect to available 
information seems called for.”). 
 138. See generally Smith, supra note 126, at 226 (finding that pre-instructed 
subjects were better able to apply the law to the facts in a case than subjects who 
were not pre-instructed). Smith notes, however, that this result cannot be seen as a 
pure effect of pretrial instruction because the group that only received pre-
instructions (and no post-instructions) did not show this improvement, but the 
results do indicate that there is benefit in hearing the instructions twice. Id. Of 
course, it is important that this legal context be substantively correct, otherwise 
jurors might try to fit the facts they hear in a trial to their incorrect understanding of 
the law. 
 139. SIMON, supra note 13, at 201. 
 140. Id. (citing REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983)). 
 141. PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM? NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE CTS. 65 (2002). The authors also found that jurors tend to persist in 
their early opinions. “If jurors are leaning toward conviction initially, they most often 
convict. A similar pattern holds for those who initially favor acquittal. However, if 
jurors are quite evenly split or the jury has only a slight majority, the case is more 
likely to hang.” Id. at 66. 
 142. See Gollwitzer, supra note 128, at 263–64 (“[D]eliberating participants 
showed an increase in their short-term memory capacity, compared with both their 
own earlier span and the span of planning participants.”); see also John Sweller et 
al., Cognitive Load as a Factor in the Structuring of Technical Material, 119 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 176 (1990) (stating that appropriate reorganization 
of material can reduce cognitive load, which will in turn facilitate problem solving). 
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with how people’s cognitive resources are used during learning and 
problem-solving.143 The intellectual complexity of the law jurors 
must learn generates intrinsic cognitive load, while the format and 
timing of jury instructions generates extraneous cognitive load.144 
Both intrinsic and extraneous load contribute to the total working 
memory load imposed on the learner, and if new material is 
presented to jurors in a way that causes them to use too many 
cognitive resources, those cognitive resources will be unavailable for 
learning.145 Intrinsic load is fixed; the law jurors are expected to 
learn is intellectually challenging, but we can minimize extraneous 
load by teaching the jurors the law when they are in a deliberative 
mindset. 
Finally, the act of making a decision about the facts, which will 
move jurors from the deliberative mindset to the implemental 
mindset, can itself lead to enhanced motivation; this transition, 
however, should not occur until after jurors understand the relevant 
law.146 If appropriately timed, this implemental mindset can help 
jurors persist at reaching a correct verdict on the facts. One study 
found that subjects in an implemental mindset persisted longer in 
solving a puzzle and in playing a computer game, and were also 
better able to disengage from the goal when appropriate.147 From 
this, the authors of the study concluded that the implemental 
mindset allows for a flexible response where the decisionmaker is 
better able to determine when she has reached a good decision.148 
                                                                                                                 
 
 143. Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176. 
 144. Sharon Tindall-Ford et al., When Two Sensory Modes Are Better Than One, 
3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 257, 260 (1997). The intellectual complexity 
of the material determines intrinsic load, while instructional design determines 
extrinsic load. Id. 
 145. Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176. 
 146. See David A. Armor & Shelley E. Taylor, The Effects of Mindset on 
Behavior: Self-Regulation in Deliberative and Implemental Frames of Mind, 29 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 86, 87 (2003) (citing various studies). 
 147. Veronika Brandstätter & Elisabeth Frank, Effects of Deliberative and 
Implemental Mindsets on Persistence in Goal-Directed Behavior, 28 PERSONALITY 
AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1366, 1366 (2002). The authors noted that the 
implemental mindset only had an impact on goal persistence in cases of “behavioral 
conflict,” and that “[n]o differences were found when the desirability and feasibility 
of the task were both low or both high.” Id. 
 148. Id. at 1377 (“Whenever a person has decided which goal to pursue and then 
commits himself or herself to the concrete aspects of implementing the goal, an 
implemental mindset . . . supports efficient goal striving—either by promoting 
persistence or by preventing undue persistence, depending on the contingencies of 
the situation.”). 
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We can improve juror decisionmaking by teaching jurors about 
the law before the introduction of evidence. If we teach jurors about 
the relevant law before they hear about the facts, they will be in a 
deliberative mindset, which motivates jurors to consider many 
different possibilities instead of trying to fit the law into the story 
they have already created. Moreover, we should encourage jurors to 
deliberate thoroughly before taking the first vote to improve the 
quality of the deliberations. Finally, this deliberative mindset will 
reduce jurors’ cognitive load and free up their cognitive resources to 
focus on learning the law and applying that law to the facts they see 
in the trial. 
B.  Knowledge & Performance Goals 
Learning is an active process and, like other learners, jurors 
must be motivated to engage in this process149 and actively learn the 
law.150 Research focusing on learning goals distinguishes between 
“knowledge goals,” or goals to advance knowledge or skill, and 
“performance goals,” or goals to complete a particular task.151 If we 
can motivate jurors to actively learn the law rather than to just 
reach a verdict, we can increase jurors’ knowledge of the substantive 
law and improve decisionmaking. 
Both motivation and cognition influence juror performance; in 
other words, the quality of a juror’s decisions about the facts will be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 149. It is worth noting that most of the research on goal setting was developed 
within industrial and organizational psychology. Edwin A. Locke & Gary P. Latham, 
New Directions in Goal-Setting Theory, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 
265, 265 (2006). Most of the focus of the research has been on employee performance 
in the workplace, though it has also been applied in sports and health care contexts. 
As Locke & Latham, the fathers of goal-setting theory note, it can and should be 
used in any context “in which an individual or group has some control over the 
outcomes.” Id. at 267. Further, one could draw many analogies between an employee 
and a juror; both are paid for their time, are expected to obtain particular results, 
have a “supervisor,” and are expected to work with others. 
 150. Both cognitive psychology and learning theory posit that learning is an 
active process and that learning depends on motivation. See Michael Hunter 
Schwartz, Teaching Law by Design: How Learning Theory and Instructional Design 
Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 374–75 (2001). 
This belief is pervasive throughout the general public as well. In a study of 
adolescents with severe learning disabilities, most tended to attribute their learning 
problems to their own lack of effort. Barry H. Schneider, LD as They See It: 
Perceptions of Adolescents in a Special Residential School, 17 J. LEARNING 
DISABILITIES 533, 533 (1984). 
 151. Evelyn Ng & Carl Bereiter, Three Levels of Goal Orientation in Learning, 1 
J. LEARNING SCI. 243, 244 (1991) (citing various studies). 
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influenced by both her understanding of the law and her motivation 
to understand the law.152 Learning goals can do one of two things: 
they can help motivate people to use their existing abilities to reach 
a decision, or they can motivate people to acquire new knowledge 
and then apply that knowledge to their decisionmaking.153 In 
situations where people already have the ability and knowledge to 
complete a goal, specific and difficult performance goals are more 
motivating and increase performance and satisfaction.154 In contrast, 
when a situation primarily requires the acquisition of new 
knowledge or skills rather than just an increase in effort and 
persistence, knowledge goals, which are framed to focus attention on 
knowledge or skill acquisition, are more effective.155 
If jurors already knew the law they needed to know to reach a 
good decision in a case, a specific performance goal to reach an 
accurate verdict might lead to greater effort and persistence.156 For 
instance, a series of experiments with experienced logging crews 
found that loggers with specific high goals (cut X number of logs 
today) had higher productivity than crews who did not have such a 
goal.157 In more than 400 studies on goal-setting, researchers have 
shown the positive effects on performance of setting specific and 
challenging performance goals.158 The performance of skilled 
employees in highly complex jobs like science and engineering,159 as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. See Ruth Kanfer & Phillip L. Ackerman, Motivation and Cognitive Abilities: 
An Integrative/Aptitude-Treatment Interaction Approach to Skill Acquisition, 74 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 657, 657 (1989) (collecting studies). 
 153. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See, e.g., Gerard H. Seijts & Gary P. Latham, Learning Versus Performance 
Goals: When Should Each be Used?, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 124, 124 (2005). 
 156. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265; Gerard H. Seijts & Gary P. 
Latham, The Effect of Distal Learning, Outcome, and Proximal Goals on a 
Moderately Complex Task, 22 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 291, 291 (2001) (stating 
“[w]hen an individual has the ability necessary to perform a task, setting a specific, 
difficult outcome goal directs attention to effort and persistence to achieve it . . . .”); 
see also Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 125 (discussing several situations in 
which companies have provided performance goals for complex tasks and the level of 
performance has improved). 
 157. Gary P. Latham & Sydney B. Kinne, Improving Job Performance Through 
Training In Goal Setting, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 187, 190 (1974). 
 158. Locke & Latham, supra note 149, at 265. 
 159. Gary P. Latham et al., Importance Of Participative Goal Setting and 
Anticipated Rewards on Goal Difficulty and Job Performance, 63 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 163, 163 (1978). 
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well as in sports and health care settings, have shown the positive 
effects of setting specific and challenging performance goals.160 
However, because jurors must first learn the relevant law before 
they can reach a decision about the facts in a trial, setting a specific 
challenging performance goal can actually be detrimental to 
performance.161 In the early stages of learning, before routines and 
skills are automatic, people must focus on learning the material 
necessary to perform well. Asking people to also focus on attaining a 
specific performance goal requires too much cognitive demand and 
distracts attention from knowledge acquisition.162 For example, if a 
novice golfer focuses on obtaining a score of 95, the novice might not 
have the cognitive resources needed to learn how to swing the club 
and master weight transfer.163 Furthermore, giving a person a 
specific challenging goal can make them so anxious to perform well 
that they fail to acquire the underlying knowledge necessary to 
achieve the goal.164 
Jurors need both knowledge goals and performance goals to 
reach a good decision, but the performance goal to reach a correct 
verdict should not be set until jurors have the legal knowledge to 
attain that goal.165 In a study testing this idea in a workplace 
setting, participants in a business simulation were asked to make 
decisions about pricing, advertising, and financing of cellular 
telephones. Participants given a knowledge goal were asked to focus 
on developing strategies to increase market share, while others were 
given a simple performance goal to attain a total market share of 
21%.166 The ultimate market share of individuals with the 
knowledge goal was almost twice as high as those with a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 125. 
 161. Id. at 126. 
 162. Id.; see Kanfer & Ackerman, supra note 152, at 687; see also JOHN SWELLER 
ET AL., COGNITIVE LOAD THEORY: EXPLORATIONS IN THE LEARNING SCIENCES, 
INSTRUCTIONAL SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGIES 108 (Springer 2011) 
(discussing cognitive load theory) (“Asking students to problem solve, particularly 
those learning new concepts and procedures (novices in the domain), creates an 
extraneous cognitive load that is detrimental to learning. Instead there should be a 
systematic process of using worked examples in the sense that worked examples 
should be programmed to include the alternation strategy . . . and consist of 
extensive practice prior to solving sets of problems unaided.”). 
 163. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 126. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 128; see also Kanfer & Ackerman, supra note 152, at 687 (noting that 
“interventions designed to engage motivational processes may impede task learning 
when presented prior to an understanding of what the task is about . . . [while those] 
following development of declarative knowledge may facilitate performance.”). 
 166. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 127. 
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performance outcome goal.167 Moreover, individuals with the 
knowledge goal “took the time necessary to acquire the knowledge to 
perform the task effectively” and “were convinced they were capable 
of mastering the task.”168 The authors concluded that this increase 
in self-efficacy was a result of the knowledge goal and the resulting 
acquisition of the knowledge necessary to perform the task well, 
while the performance goal led to a “mad scramble” for solutions.169 
Finally, knowledge goals will be more helpful to jurors who are 
trying to construct a “story” about the evidence they will ultimately 
see in a trial. The story model of juror decisionmaking suggests that 
in order to make sense of all of the evidence they are asked to 
evaluate, jurors construct a story of what they think happened.170 
Knowledge goals will motivate jurors to try to answer questions 
about the law or facts needed to understand the story.171 These 
focused knowledge goals will also help jurors to conserve limited 
cognitive resources by allowing them to spend time drawing 
inferences relevant to their goals of understanding the story and 
ignoring irrelevant information.172 
The difference between knowledge and performance goals is 
“first and foremost a mindset,” and much of the difference to jurors 
will be in how we frame their goals as jurors.173 For a performance 
goal, instructions would be framed around task performance; for 
instance, in a typical trial, jurors are told they should apply the law 
they are given to the facts they have heard in a trial to reach a 
verdict.174 The acquisition of the knowledge to attain the goal is not 
mentioned because knowledge of the law and the skill to apply it to 
the facts is considered a given.175 In contrast, a knowledge goal 
would frame the instructions in terms of knowledge acquisition; 
jurors could be told which law they are expected to understand 
                                                                                                                 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 127–28. 
 169. Id. at 127. 
 170. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 10, at 519. 
 171. Ashwin Ram, A Theory of Questions and Question Asking, 1 J. LEARNING 
SCI. 273, 282 (1991). 
 172. Id. at 275 (“What the system learns from the story depends on what it 
needs to learn, that is, on its knowledge goals.”). 
 173. Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 128. 
 174. See, e.g., Vt. Gen. Jury Instructions, available at http://www.vtbar.org/User 
Files/Files/WebPages/Attorney%20Resources/juryinstructions/civiljuryinstructions/ge
neraljury.htm (last visited July 18, 2013) (“It is your duty as jurors to follow the law 
as I shall state it to you, and to apply that law to the facts as you find them from the 
evidence presented in court.”). 
 175. See Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, at 128. 
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before they are asked to apply it to a set of facts. The knowledge goal 
“draws attention away from the end result”176 and instead moves the 
focus to an understanding of the substantive law. Once the jury has 
that knowledge, it can be given a performance goal to reach a verdict 
using that law. 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS: WHAT MOTIVATED COGNITION MEANS FOR 
HOW WE SHOULD TEACH JURORS ABOUT THE LAW  
Although extensive training in the law is not possible given the 
time constraints of a typical trial, we can draw upon these insights 
from studies of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to efficiently 
learn the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to 
the facts they will see in a trial. Once we understand how to harness 
the power of motivated cognition, we can use principles of 
educational psychology to increase efficient learning and allow jurors 
to study and learn the law they will apply in a trial. Specifically, we 
can teach jurors the law using a variety of formats to increase 
learning before the introduction of evidence, we can give jurors 
knowledge goals and allow them to ask questions to enhance their 
understanding of the law and the facts, and we can ask jurors to 
explain the law to themselves through the use of special verdict 
forms. 
A.  Teach Jurors About the Law Before the Introduction of Evidence 
The timing and form of jury instructions and juror education 
about the applicable law can have a profound impact on juror 
comprehension of the law.177 Some courts have begun to pre-instruct 
jurors about the substantive law, giving jurors an overview of the 
relevant black letter law and general legal principles before the 
introduction of evidence, and eight states currently require pre-
instruction.178 In other states, judges have discretion to determine 
the timing of jury instructions.179 Psychology research tells us that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163; Heuer & Penrod, supra note 
45, at 409, 425–26. 
 178. For an overview of state law on juror pre-instruction on substantive law, see 
State of the States Survey, supra note 22, at 36. 
 179. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 809 (2012). Appellate courts consistently leave decisions 
about the timing of instructions to the discretion of the trial court judge. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ruppel, 666 F.2d 261, 273–74 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Valenzuela, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 655, 657 (Ct. App. 1977). Some appellate opinions encourage the use of 
pre-trial instruction. See Valenzuela, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 658 (“[W]e commend the 
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this type of pre-instruction can help motivate jurors to get a handle 
on the applicable law before they become too bogged down in the 
facts of a trial, allowing them to better understand and remember 
the evidence they will hear in a trial.180 
Much of the time, however, juror pre-instruction only addresses 
general legal principles like burden of proof or reasonable doubt, and 
does not usually include specific instruction about the elements of 
the crime or claims at issue.181 Moreover, even when jurors are pre-
instructed, this addresses the timing rather than the form of the 
instructions. The instructions still leave most of the responsibility 
for teaching and learning to the jurors themselves, with little 
monitoring of how well jurors actually comprehend the substantive 
law or additional assistance if jurors do not understand the law 
included in the instructions.182 
We should go further and give jurors a comprehensive education 
on all of the legal principles they will be expected to understand and 
apply during a trial before they hear the facts.183 If jurors learn the 
law before they hear the facts, they will be in a deliberative mindset 
when they receive their education about the law, making them more 
receptive to new information and more impartial when processing 
evidence.184 Because jurors are typically not given instructions on 
the applicable law until after the presentation of evidence, they have 
already created an initial impression of the case, and the law that 
they learn will tend to support that established disposition.185 They 
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 180. See Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 163 (finding that pre-instructions gave 
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remember it); Heuer & Penrod, supra note 45, at 409, 425–26 (finding that pre-
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 181. See State of the States Survey, supra note 22, at 36. 
 182. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supra note 24, at 164. 
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trial and the ones they are most likely to decide. 
 184. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 185. See Heuer & Penrod, supra note 45, at 412. 
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will have already begun to analyze the facts and reach a decision 
without the benefit of an education about the applicable law.186 If 
instead we teach jurors the applicable law before the presentation of 
evidence, they will still be in the deliberative mindset when they 
learn the law, leading to more careful consideration of the law and 
better decisions. 
Furthermore, research in cognitive load theory suggests that 
jurors should be introduced to information in a variety of ways—not 
just through written or verbal instructions—in order to reduce the 
load on working memory and improve comprehension.187 Some 
instructional presentations impose such a heavy cognitive load 
before learning begins (because they require the learner to mentally 
organize and process multiple elements) that they can interfere with 
the acquisition of new knowledge.188 Because learning and problem-
solving impose heavy cognitive demand, the form of the presentation 
itself should minimize the use of cognitive resources and allow 
learners to devote available cognitive load to the acquisition of new 
knowledge.189 We can reorganize learning materials to eliminate 
extraneous cognitive load and improve learning and problem-
solving.190 Specifically, when material is intellectually challenging—
thus imposing a high intrinsic cognitive load—learning materials 
that combine dual-mode presentation techniques—e.g., auditory text 
and visual diagrams—result in better learning.191 
In the jury setting, we can improve juror comprehension of the 
law by instructing jurors using dual-mode presentation techniques, 
which would combine standard jury instructions with flowcharts and 
animated videos. One study of these kinds of instructions showed 
that jurors given a simple flowchart outlining the law of self-
defense—in conjunction with verbal instructions about the law—had 
improved comprehension of the law.192 In another study, mock jurors 
                                                                                                                 
 
 186. See id. 
 187. See Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176; Tindall-Ford et al., supra note 
144, at 257. 
 188. See Sweller et al., supra note 142, at 176. 
 189. See id. 
 190. Id.; Tindall-Ford et al., supra note 144, at 260. 
 191. Tindall-Ford et al., supra note 144, at 282. 
 192. Carolyn Semmler & Neil Brewer, Using a Flow-Chart to Improve 
Comprehension of Jury Instructions, 9 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 262, 266 (2002). 
The authors are careful to note, however, that despite increased comprehension of 
the underlying law, when the study participants were asked to apply their 
knowledge (from the instructions and the flow chart) to novel scenarios, most still 
performed poorly, although “there was a hint of better performance in the instruction 
plus refer flow-chart condition.” Id. Therefore, flow-charts should not be the only 
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who were shown an animated video depicting various elements of 
self-defense (in conjunction with verbal instructions about the law 
and flowcharts) showed marked improvement in comprehension 
across a variety of measures, including verdict accuracy, a multiple-
choice test, a paraphrase measure, and a test of transfer of legal 
knowledge to novel facts.193 
Furthermore, the use of animated videos has been shown to 
bring lay jurors’ level of comprehension of self-defense up to that of 
law students who had completed an entire criminal law course.194 In 
this study, the judge described the legal components of murder and 
self-defense, specifically the requirement that there be a “reasonable 
possibility” that the defendant acted in self-defense.195 While the 
judge was describing the elements, participants saw an animation of 
three balls, in separate frames, being thrown against a pane of 
glass.196 “A tennis ball had ‘a chance,’ a baseball had a ‘reasonable 
possibility,’ and a steel ball was ‘almost certain,’ to break the 
glass.”197 Although the law students’ performance was superior to 
other legally untrained subjects when both heard standard verbal 
instructions, that performance difference disappeared when both 
saw the animated video.198 
By teaching jurors the substantive law at the beginning of their 
jury service when jurors are still in a deliberative mindset, we can 
motivate jurors to learn the applicable law before they are expected 
to apply it to the facts in a trial. Research in goal setting suggests 
that this will increase juror self-efficacy and improve 
decisionmaking. Furthermore, we should introduce the law to jurors 
in a variety of ways in order to reduce cognitive load and improve 
comprehension. 
                                                                                                                 
 
method to increase juror comprehension and performance, but should be combined 
with the other methods and approaches outlined here. 
 193. Neil Brewer et al., Improving Comprehension of Jury Instructions with 
Audio-Visual Presentation, 18 APPLIED COGN. PSYCHOL. 765, 773 (2004). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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 197. Id. at 769. In another vignette, the judge spoke about the requirement that 
the defendant believe her conduct was “necessary and reasonable.” While he spoke, 
two animations appeared. “The first depicted a man pointing a knife at a woman’s 
throat, she then looked around before kicking the man to the ground, apparently 
believing she had no choice.” Id. The second showed the same characters, “but when 
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 198. Id. at 773. The law students failed to improve and the legally untrained 
subjects’ performance matched the law students’ performance levels. Id. 
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B.  Allow Jurors to Ask Questions About the Law and the Facts 
Allowing jurors to ask questions allows them to reason, to 
understand, and to learn.199 Giving jurors knowledge goals and then 
allowing them to ask questions about the law will motivate jurors to 
acquire and organize new legal knowledge.200 When jurors are given 
a knowledge goal—to learn the relevant substantive law—this goal 
will often take the form of questions when they have insufficient 
knowledge to deal with the facts in the case.201 These knowledge 
goals will cause jurors to “focus on what he or she needs to know, to 
formulate questions in acquiring this knowledge, and to learn by 
pursuing these questions.”202 Learning occurs when the juror’s 
questions are answered.203 These knowledge goals, then, focus the 
learning process and direct learning.204 
Some courts allow juries to ask questions of witnesses, and a few 
states even require that jurors be permitted to ask questions.205 
Several studies have shown that asking questions is helpful to 
jurors’ understanding of the case, especially in cases where the 
evidence or law is particularly complex.206 Specifically, asking 
questions allows jurors to clarify complicated testimony or legal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 199. Ram, supra note 171, at 273; see also Claude Sammut & Ranan B. Banerji, 
Learning Concepts by Asking Questions, in 2 MACHINE LEARNING: AN ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE APPROACH 167, 168 (Ryszard S. Michalski et al. eds., 1986) (noting 
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 200. See Ram, supra note 171, at 274; see also Seijts & Latham, supra note 155, 
at 125 (noting that knowledge goals facilitate learning by focusing an individual’s 
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 201. See Ram, supra note 171, at 273. 
 202. Id. at 274. 
 203. Id. at 274–75. 
 204. Id. at 277. 
 205. For an overview of state law on juror questions, see State of the States 
Survey supra note 22, at 34–35. In a survey of 11,752 trials in all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, 15.1% of state court trials allowed juror questions of witnesses, 
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and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective for determining 
the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or 
undue embarrassment.” FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
 206. Dann, supra note 46, at 1253; Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror 
Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1963 
(2006); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation in Trials 
Through Note Taking And Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256, 262 (1995–96). 
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issues.207 Moreover, asking questions allows jurors to engage more 
actively in the presentation of testimony and to develop their 
understanding of the trial “story” because “the answers to juror 
questions appear to supplement and deepen juror understanding of 
the evidence.”208 To the extent that jurors are like students who need 
to understand the law they will need to apply in a trial, questions 
allow jurors to clarify their understanding, correct confusion, and 
improve comprehension.209 In national field experiments of states 
that permitted and did not permit juror questions, jurors who were 
allowed to ask questions rated themselves as better informed about 
the law.210 
Opponents of juror questions point out that it can distract jurors, 
delay the trial process, and remove jurors “from their appropriate 
role as neutral fact finders.”211 Some judges also express concern 
that jurors might give undue weight to a judge’s decision not to 
permit a juror question.212 Studies of juror questions have shown, 
however, that questions do not add significant time to trials, and 
that jurors tend to focus their questions on the primary legal issues 
in the case.213 Furthermore, most of these potential problems are 
mitigated by procedures governing the asking of questions, including 
requiring judges and attorneys to screen questions before they are 
presented to witnesses.214 Furthermore, one study found that jurors 
rarely expressed surprise, let alone offense, when judges did not 
permit witnesses to answer a question.215 
Most courts that do permit juror questions, however, only allow 
questions about the facts of the case rather than about the law.216 
When judges do receive a question from a juror about the law, they 
typically tell the juror they cannot answer the question, or they refer 
the juror to the jury instructions.217 But sometimes the jury 
instructions are not enough to clarify jurors’ understanding of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 207. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 206, at 262. 
 208. Diamond et al., supra note 206, at 1931. 
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 210. Heuer & Penrod, supra note 206, at 260. 
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law.218 We should go further and allow jurors to ask questions when 
they are confused about the underlying substantive law. These 
questions could be answered by the judge, and like jurors’ questions 
of witnesses, the judge could serve as a gatekeeper, and all potential 
questions could be approved by the attorneys in the case to ensure 
that the questions are not unfairly prejudicial to either side.219 
Furthermore, questions can signal to the judge and the lawyers in a 
case that jurors are unclear on an area of law.220 Although jurors are 
the triers of fact, asking questions about the law will help jurors to 
better understand the relevant law in order to make better decisions 
about the facts.221 
Finally, by letting jurors ask questions and giving them reasons 
for why the law should apply the way it does, we can motivate jurors 
to correctly apply the instructions they receive. As Professor Duane 
Wegener notes in Flexible Corrections, “it is not enough to simply tell 
jurors what the law requires; the judge’s instructions must sell them 
on the goal of adhering to the constraints of the law.”222 Research in 
other contexts has shown that giving jurors this kind of explanation 
does make them more likely to follow the judge’s instructions.223 For 
instance, one study found that when jurors were told that the 
compensatory damages they awarded would be trebled, they gave 
significantly lower awards,224 suggesting that jurors tended to lower 
their awards to avoid a windfall for plaintiffs.225 When the same 
jurors were told to ignore the trebling rule, the awards did not 
increase.226 However, when the jurors were told the rationale behind 
the trebling rule, the awards increased significantly.227 
Because jurors must acquire new knowledge about the law before 
they apply that law to the facts in a case, knowledge goals, which 
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could be framed to focus jurors’ attention on learning the law, will be 
more effective than simply admonishing jurors to reach an accurate 
verdict.228 Furthermore, giving jurors knowledge goals and then 
allowing them to ask questions about the law may motivate jurors to 
avoid closure and to continue considering other possibilities and 
generating multiple hypotheses about events.229 If jurors are 
motivated to avoid closure in this way, this could lead to reliance on 
better reasoning strategies, fewer biases, and greater accuracy, thus 
improving juror decisionmaking.230 
C.  Instruct Jurors to Complete Special Verdict Forms 
Jurors can be taught to know what they do not know, to assess 
how correct their decisions are, to efficiently use their own cognitive 
resources, and to monitor their own learning process.231 This process 
is known as metacognition, or “thinking about one’s own 
thinking,”232 and refers to the understanding and awareness that 
allows people to take control of their own learning.233 Because it is 
the juror who must ultimately store and retrieve the law, it is crucial 
that they be active participants in learning that law.234 If jurors are 
better able to think about their own thinking and their own 
understanding of the relevant law, they will make better decisions 
about the facts in a trial. Special verdict forms, which require jurors 
to explicitly consider how the facts in a case support each element of 
each claim and to explain the connection between law and facts,235 
can help make jurors accountable for their decisions and therefore 
increase accuracy motives.236 In turn, this accountability can 
motivate jurors to be more complex in their thinking and more 
accurate in their judgment.237  
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One way to increase efficient learning is to ask people to make 
effective self-explanations because explaining enhances 
understanding.238 “A self-explanation is a mental dialog that 
learners have when studying . . . [which] leads to an understanding 
that builds a complete and accurate mental model.”239 When people 
learn new information, they learn it more efficiently if they are 
asked to explain that new information to themselves.240 A good self-
explanation requires deep processing of the material and can 
therefore improve performance.241 Furthermore, the positive effects 
of self-explanations have been seen in a variety of contexts and 
across age ranges.242 In a study testing the benefits of self-
explaining, eighth-grade students read a passage about the human 
circulatory system.243 Half of the students then read the passage a 
second time while the other half were instead asked to self-explain 
what they had just read.244 All of the students took a test of the 
circulatory system before and after reading the passage.245 Students 
who self-explained learned more, and the students who generated to 
most self-explanations learned the most.246 As the authors noted, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. RUTH CLARK ET AL., EFFICIENCY IN LEARNING: EVIDENCE-BASED 
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“not only does eliciting self-explanations promote greater learning, 
but the more students self-explain, the deeper their 
understanding.”247 
Jurors can be asked to self-explain through the use of a special 
verdict form. Judges can require jurors to return a verdict in civil 
cases in three ways: a general verdict, a general verdict with 
interrogatories, or a special verdict.248 General verdicts ask jurors to 
declare the winning party and the relief granted; general verdicts 
with interrogatories ask jurors to give a general verdict and to 
answer specific factual questions; and special verdicts ask the jury to 
answer a series of factual questions that are relevant to the legal 
issues in the case.249 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
describe special verdicts as requiring only “a special written finding 
on each issue of fact,” they often consist of mixed questions of law 
and fact.250 Because each question in a special verdict form refers to 
a specific fact necessary to satisfy each element of the legal claim, 
they require jurors to think about each element individually and 
help jurors think about the elements within the context of the 
factual case.251 
Special verdict forms can improve jurors’ metacognition and 
decisionmaking by highlighting the structure jurors should follow 
when they deliberate about complex concepts, and the self-
explaining associated with special verdict forms can make jurors 
accountable for their decisions and motivate them to be more 
accurate.252 Moreover, if jurors are required to think through how 
the facts in a case support each element of each claim, they will be 
better able to recognize the quality of their own understanding of the 
law. Furthermore, special verdict forms could help prevent the 
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coherence effect, whereby jurors faced with complex legal concepts 
and ambiguous facts reduce complex decisions to more manageable 
decisions they can feel confident about.253 Special verdict forms can 
improve jury decisionmaking in both civil and criminal cases 
because the forms can help jurors isolate individual elements of 
claims and crimes, offsetting the potential coherence effect.254 In 
cases where there is substantial evidence for one element but only 
minimal or insufficient evidence for another, the coherence effect 
suggests that fact finders will find the defendant liable or guilty 
despite the lack of evidence of a particular element.255 “In such 
cases, correctly administered special verdicts could serve to expose 
that evidentiary deficiency.”256 
In studies examining the effect of special verdict forms on juror 
comprehension, mock jurors reported feeling more informed about 
the law, more confident that their verdict was correct, and more 
confident that their verdict reflected a proper understanding of the 
law.257 Jurors found special verdict forms to be especially helpful in 
cases involving large quantities of information.258 Other studies have 
found that although special verdict forms improved understanding of 
the law, they did not affect the jurors’ ultimate decisions, and that 
jurors made decisions based on their impression of the parties and 
not on an “orderly consideration of legal issues.”259 Of course, jurors 
were not told about the law until after the end of evidence, at which 
point they “appeared to have already formed strong impressions of 
the parties,” and special verdict forms did little to ameliorate this 
effect.260 If jurors are instead taught the law before the presentation 
of evidence, this effect can be minimized.261 
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If jurors are taught to think about their own understanding of 
the law, they will make better decisions about the facts. We can 
encourage this juror metacognition by requiring jurors to complete 
special verdict forms that ask jurors to think about each element of 
each claim individually and to consider how they fit within the 
context of the factual case. This requirement will help increase 
jurors’ accountability for their decisions, increase their motive to be 
accurate, and lead to better decisionmaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Because juries are typically composed of lay people with no 
special legal training or background, jurors must first be educated 
about the applicable substantive law and procedural rules before 
they can reach a decision on the facts. The entirety of most jurors’ 
education on the law is contained in jury instructions, which tell 
jurors about the applicable law and give them a mechanism to 
interpret the facts they have seen in a trial. While the instructions 
are meant to teach jurors about the relevant law, they are not 
typically written with the jurors’ education in mind, nor do they 
generally offer much guidance to jurors for applying the law to the 
facts of the case in order to reach a decision. And while knowledge 
acquisition should be a major component of the jury’s task, jury 
research has consistently shown that jurors only understand about 
half of the law they are expected to apply to the facts in a trial.262 
Extensive training in the law is not possible given the time 
constraints of a typical trial, but we can draw upon insights from 
studies of motivated cognition to motivate jurors to efficiently learn 
the law and to think carefully about how the law will apply to the 
facts they will see in a trial. All people are intrinsically motivated to 
make sense of their surroundings, and jurors are similarly motivated 
to understand the law they will need to apply to the facts in a trial in 
order to reach an accurate verdict. These core social motives affect 
the cognition and decisionmaking of all jurors, and we can use these 
motives to increase juror comprehension of the law and improve 
decisionmaking. Like other frameworks and biases that affect how 
people perceive and interpret information, we cannot eliminate this 
type of motivated cognition, but we can use it to motivate jurors to 
understand the law, to be accurate in that understanding, and to 
persist in thinking about the law until they reach a good decision. 
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